



The bridge to possible

# Bezpieczeństwo OT

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


# Industrial IoT networking portfolio Overview

Our solutions meet the needs of IT and operations

### Industrial Ethernet switches

DIN-Rail, IP67, and Stackable Rackmount



IE3400      IE3300      IE3200      IE3100

IE3400H      IE9300

### Industrial Cybersecurity

Cyber Vision, Secure Equipment Access



CV Sensors      SEA Agents

### Industrial Wi-Fi and Ultra-reliable Wireless Backhaul

For outdoor conditions




IW9165E      IW9165D      IW9167i

IW9167E      IW9167E-HZ

### Industrial Routers

Modular 4G/5G – for connecting remote and mobile assets



IR1100      IR1800

IR8300      IR8100


### Data Control and Exchange

Edge Intelligence, IOx



### Embedded Networking



Embedded routers and switches for industrial Makers



ESR6300      ESS3300      ESS9300

## Management and Automation

Cisco Catalyst Center, Cisco Catalyst WAN Manager, Field Network Director



# Securing Critical Infrastructure is a Key Priority

## NERC CIP

Substations & Renewable Energy


CIP-005-7 — Cyber Security — Electronic Security Perimeter(s)

**A. Introduction**

- Title:** Cyber Security — Electronic Security Perimeter(s)
- Number:** CIP-005-7
- Purpose:** To manage electronic access to BES Cyber Systems by specifying a controlled Electronic Security Perimeter in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES.
- Applicability:**
  - Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as "Responsible Entities." For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.
    - Balancing Authority**
    - Distribution Provider** that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
      - 4.1.2.1.** Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:
        - 4.1.2.1.1.** is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
        - 4.1.2.1.2.** performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
      - 4.1.2.2.** Each Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) where the RAS is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
      - 4.1.2.3.** Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one

## TSA Security Directives

Rail, Pipelines, Airports



U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Transportation Security Administration  
6595 Springfield Center Drive  
Springfield, Virginia 20598

**NUMBER** Security Directive 1580/82-2022-01

**SUBJECT** Rail Cybersecurity Mitigation Actions and Testing

**EFFECTIVE DATE** October 24, 2022

**EXPIRATION DATE** October 24, 2023

**SUPERSEDES** Not Applicable

**APPLICABILITY** Each freight railroad carrier identified in 49 CFR 1580.101 and other TSA-designated freight and passenger railroads

**AUTHORITY** 49 U.S.C. 114(d), (f), (l) and (m)

**LOCATION** All locations within the United States

**I. PURPOSE AND GENERAL INFORMATION**

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is issuing this Security Directive due to the ongoing cybersecurity threat to surface transportation systems and associated infrastructure to mitigate the significant harm to the national and economic security of the United States that could result from the "degradation, destruction, or malfunction of systems that control this infrastructure."<sup>1</sup>

This Security Directive requires actions necessary to protect the national security, economy, and public health and safety of the United States and its citizens from the impact of malicious cyber-intrusions affecting the nation's railroads.<sup>2</sup> Even minor disruptions in critical rail systems may result in temporary product shortages that can cause significant harm to national security. Prolonged disruptions in the flow of commodities could lead to widespread supply

## NIS2

Energy, Transport, Water, Manufacturing, .....

BRIEFING

EU Legislation in Progress



European Parliament

### The NIS2 Directive

#### A high common level of cybersecurity in the EU

**OVERVIEW**

The Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive is the first piece of EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity, and its specific aim was to achieve a high common level of cybersecurity across the Member States. While it increased the Member States' cybersecurity capabilities, its implementation proved difficult, resulting in fragmentation at different levels across the internal market.

To respond to the growing threats posed with digitalisation and the surge in cyber-attacks, the Commission has submitted a proposal to replace the NIS Directive and thereby strengthen the security requirements, address the security of supply chains, streamline reporting obligations, and introduce more stringent supervisory measures and stricter enforcement requirements, including harmonised sanctions across the EU. The proposed expansion of the scope covered by NIS2, by effectively obliging more entities and sectors to take measures, would assist in increasing the level of cybersecurity in Europe in the longer term.

Within the European Parliament, the file was assigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. The committee adopted its report on 28 October 2021, while the Council agreed its position on 3 December 2021. The co-legislators reached a provisional agreement on the text on 13 May 2022. The political agreement was formally adopted by the Parliament and then the Council in November 2022. It entered into force on 16 January 2023, and Member States now have 21 months, until 17 October 2024, to transpose its measures into national law.

Proposal for a directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union		
<b>Committee responsible:</b>	Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)	COM(2020) 823
<b>Rapporteur:</b>	Bart Groothuis (Renew, the Netherlands)	16.12.2021
<b>Shadow rapporteurs:</b>	Eva Maydell (EPP, Bulgaria) Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece) Rasmus Andresen (Greens/EFA, Germany) Thierry Mariani (ID, France)	2020/0359(COD)  Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)

# There are increasing demands on security teams

## Business evolution




Unlimited devices



Transition to the cloud



Distributed workforces



Digital transformation


## Security pressures




Too little visibility



Too few experts



Too little integration




Too much exposure

# Cisco Industrial Security Solution


1

Build a Security Foundation




2

Security Posture & ZTNA of OT Assets




3

Segment Network into Smaller Trust Zones



4

Develop Incident Investigation & Response



Talos Threat Intelligence

+



Talos Incident Response


# Cisco Validated Designs



Cisco Validated Design




Reference architectures validated for the specific needs of your industry



Faster deployments



Less risk



Predictability



End to end designs


Design, deploy, and extend networking and cybersecurity technologies successfully



Helping industries with generic and specific designs, as well as addressing regulatory requirements.




# The Cisco Industrial Security Differentiation



# Unique edge monitoring architecture

Industrial cybersecurity that can be deployed at scale





# The role of the Cyber Vision Sensor

## Collects Industrial Network Traffic



Captures industrial network flows (passive) and queries devices (active). Stores data locally in case the Center is not accessible

## Decodes Industrial Protocols (DPI)



Understands most OT and IT communication protocols to analyze packet payloads and extract meaningful information

## Sends Metadata to the Cyber Vision Center



Sends metadata to the Center for storage, analysis and visualization. This only adds 3 to 5% extra traffic to the network

# Cisco Cyber Vision portfolio

## Cyber Vision Center

### Hardware Appliance

UCS based servers with Hardware RAID



CV-CNTR-M5S5

- 16 core CPU
- 64 GB RAM
- 800GB drives

CV-CNTR-M5S3

- 10 core CPU
- 32 GB RAM
- 480GB drives

### Software Appliance

Virtual Machines



VMWare ESXi OVA



HyperV VHD

#### Minimum requirements

Intel Xeon, 10 cores  
32GB RAM and 1TB SSD  
1 or 2 network interfaces



Amazon Web Services



Microsoft Azure

#### Minimum requirements

Intel Xeon, 10 cores  
32GB RAM and 1TB SSD  
1 or 2 network interfaces

## Cyber Vision Sensors



Catalyst IE3300 and IE3400 Switches



Catalyst IE3400HD IP67 Switch



Catalyst IR1101 LTE/5G Gateway



Catalyst IR8300 Multiservice Router



Catalyst IE9300 Rugged Aggregation Switches



Catalyst 9300/9400

### Network-Sensors

Deep Packet Inspection built into network-elements eliminating the need for SPAN



IC3000 Industrial Compute

### Hardware-Sensor


DPI via SPAN to support brownfield



### Container Sensor

DPI via SPAN to support brownfield

# Cyber Vision offers **flexible deployment options**



- **Network-sensors** embedded in Cisco networking for simple and highly scalable deployments
- **Hardware-sensors** capturing traffic on any switch with a single hop SPAN
- **On-Center sensor** to leverage existing SPAN infrastructures, or collect traffic within the datacenter




Cyber Vision can mix architectures to best fit your constraints

# Cisco Cyber Vision in Manufacturing

IT

OT



- 1 Isolate IT and OT by installing an industrial DMZ with Cisco Secure FW
- 2 Create macro-segmentation zones in the Catalyst 9300 switches and deploy Cyber Vision sensors with Snort IDS.
- 3 Cyber Vision sensors deployed within segments across IE3400 switches
- 4 Cyber Vision hardware-sensors deployed via one-hop SPAN to gain visibility on non-Cisco switches
- 5 Build zones and conduits in Cyber Vision and share with ISE for micro segmentation
- 6 Cyber Vision shares details on OT devices and events with SOC to build informed security policies and investigate threats across domains



# Comprehensive asset inventory

- Automatically maintain a detailed list of all OT and IT equipment
- Immediate access to software and hardware characteristics
- Track rack-slot components
- Tags make it easy to understand asset functions and properties

Track the industrial assets to protect throughout their life cycles

The screenshot displays the Cisco Meraki dashboard's 'Component list' view. The interface includes a left-hand navigation menu with icons for Home, Inventory, Alerts, and Settings. The main content area shows a table of 66 components. The table columns are: Component (with a dropdown arrow), Group, First activity, Last activity, IP, MAC, Tags, and Flows. The components are listed with their respective details, including manufacturer (e.g., Dell, Hirschmann, Fisher), IP addresses, MAC addresses, and various tags like 'Read Var', 'Write Var', 'Public IP', and 'DeltaV'. The top of the dashboard shows the date range 'May 29, 2018 3:16:34 PM - Jun 20, 2019 4:16:34 PM (1y 22d 1h)' and a 'LIVE' indicator.

Component	Group	First activity	Last activity	IP	MAC	Tags	Flows
Dell 192.168.105.241	Maintenance Station	Apr 6, 2017 10:59:14 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	-	34:17:eb:d1:c9:97	Read Var, Write Var, Engineering Station, Remote access	579
149.178.42.70	Infrastructure 2	Oct 5, 2017 6:03:16 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	-	2c:6b:f5:62:e7:80	DNS Server, Public IP	38
232.108.116.118	-	Apr 6, 2017 10:58:44 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	-	01:00:5e:6c:74:76	Multicast, Public IP	8
AMBRE	IT Machines - To Investigate	Apr 6, 2017 10:58:58 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	-	00:24:9b:08:43:6f	Windows	7
10.16.116.254	-	Apr 6, 2017 10:58:44 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	-	00:22:e5:21:0a:86	Read Var, Write Var, Wireless IO Module, DeltaV	44
SIMATIC 300(1)	-	Apr 6, 2017 11:29:22 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	192.168.0.1	00:0e:8c:84:5b:a6	Read Var, PLC	25
10.8.0.6	-	Apr 6, 2017 10:58:45 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	-	84:8f:69:e1:a7:9b	Read Var, DNS Server, Time Server, Windows, DeltaV	16099
OWS1	Emerson Process	Apr 6, 2017 10:58:45 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	-	d4:ae:52:aa:dc:93	Read Var, Write Var, Windows, DeltaV	16071
239.192.24.4	-	Oct 5, 2017 6:03:14 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	239.192.24.4	01:00:5e:40:18:04	Multicast, Public IP	17
Hirschmann 192.168.1.254	Yokogawa CentumVP	Oct 5, 2017 6:03:14 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	192.168.1.254	ec:74:ba:03:98:6b	Time Server	4
Fisher 10.4.0.14	Emerson Process	Apr 6, 2017 10:58:44 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	10.4.0.14	00:22:e5:1f:9a:54	Read Var, Write Var	35
WIOC-1F903A	Emerson Process	Apr 6, 2017 10:58:45 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	10.5.0.22	00:22:e5:1f:90:18	Read Var, Write Var, DeltaV	41
ff02::1:fff:3b4b	-	Apr 6, 2017 10:59:14 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	ff02::1:fff:3b4b	33:33:fff:3b:4b	Multicast, Public IP	2
IM151-3PN	Manuf IO	Apr 6, 2017 11:29:22 PM	Jun 18, 2019 12:23:34 AM	192.168.0.2	08:00:06:6b:f6:16	IO Module	6

# Detailed information on assets

Insights on risks, vulnerabilities, communications, variables, etc.

Asset characteristics, version and network configuration

Control logic properties

Rack slot component details

The screenshot displays the Cisco ICSA Asset Manager interface for a specific asset. The asset is identified as a Rockwell Automation PLC (Munich) with IP 192.168.249.50 and MAC f4:54:33:91:cb:ee. The interface is divided into several sections:

- Summary:** Shows basic device information, activity history (First activity: Sep 10, 2020 3:36:37 PM; Last activity: Jan 19, 2022 2:00:01 AM), and tags such as Controller, Rockwell Automation, Start CPU, Stop CPU, Diagnostics, Read Var, Write Var, Low Volume, CIP-IO, EthernetIP, and Umas.
- Properties:** Divided into Normalized Properties (fw-version: 31.11, 31.011; ip: 192.168.249.50; mac: f4:54:33:91:cb:ee; model-ref: 0x99, 0x474, 1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER; name: 1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER, SecDemo\_LinePLC, 24VDC 16PT INPUT & 16PT OUTPUT (Port1-Link01); public-ip: no; serial-number: 60771949, 00000000; vendor-name: Rockwell Automation) and Other Properties (enip-cpuname: SecDemo\_LinePLC; enip-devicetype: ProgrammableLogicController, GeneralPurposeDiscreteIO; enip-location: Endpoint, Port1-Link00, Port1-Link01; enip-name: 1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER, 24VDC 16PT INPUT & 16PT OUTPUT; enip-productcode: 0x99, 0x474; enip-serial: 00000000, 60771949; enip-status: Owned, AtLeastOneIOConnectionInRunMode, NoIOConnectionsEstablished, AtLeastOneIOConnectionInRunMode, MinorRecoverableFault, ReservedBits12-15:0x3; enip-value: RA-ProgramName; enip-vendor: Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley; enip-version: 31.11, 31.011; name-enip: 1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER, SecDemo\_LinePLC, 24VDC 16PT INPUT & 16PT OUTPUT (Port1-Link01); name-vendorip: Rockwell 192.168.249.50; vendor: Rockwell Automation).
- Components:** A table listing four components with their respective activity dates, IP addresses, MAC addresses, tags, vulnerabilities, flows, VLAN IDs, and sensors.


Component	First activity	Last activity	IP	MAC	Tags	Vulnerabilities	Flows	VLAN ID	Sensor
1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER	Sep 10, 2020 3:36:38 PM	Jan 19, 2022 2:00:01 AM	192.168.249.50	f4:54:33:91:cb:ee	Controller	10	-10	-	
SecDemo_LinePLC	Sep 10, 2020 3:36:41 PM	Jan 19, 2022 2:00:01 AM	192.168.249.50	f4:54:33:91:cb:ee	Controller	10	-10	-	
24VDC 16PT INPUT & 16PT OUTPUT (Port1-Link01)	Sep 10, 2020 3:36:41 PM	Jan 19, 2022 2:00:01 AM	192.168.249.50	f4:54:33:91:cb:ee	No tags	0	-10	-	
1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER	Sep 10, 2020 3:36:37 PM	Jan 19, 2022 2:00:01 AM	192.168.249.50	f4:54:33:91:cb:ee	Controller, Rockwell Automation	10	-20	-	

Tags to easily understand characteristics, activities, and threats

# Detailed communication maps


- Identify all relations between assets including application flows
- Spot unwanted communications & noisy assets
- Tags make it easy to understand the content of each communication flow
- View live information or go back in time

Drive network segmentation and fine-tune configurations




# Aggregated activities match ISA/IEC 62443 conduits

Unaggregated



View all asset relationships

Aggregated




Easily browse through conduits



# Aggregated components match the physical inventory

## Map view



Double-border icons indicate a device with multiple components

## ID Cards

Controller Rack

1769-L16ER/B LOGIX53...  
Paint\_Line2 high  
IP: 192.168.249.50  
MAC: f4:54:33:91:cb:ee

First activity: Apr 28, 2021 11:48:40 AM  
Last activity: Apr 28, 2021 11:48:46 AM

Sensor: -

Tags: Controller, Rockwell Automation

Activity tags: Read Var, Write Var, Low Volume, CIP-IO, EthernetIP

Risk score: 80% See details

Modules:

- Rockwell 192.168.249.50
- Rockwell 192.168.249.50
- Rockwell 192.168.249.50
- Rockwell 192.168.249.50
- 24VDC 16PT INPUT & 16PT OUTPUT (Port1-Link01)
- Rockwell 192.168.249.50
- 1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER
- SecDemo\_LinePLC | 1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER
- Rockwell 192.168.249.50

Properties:

fw-version: 31.011  
ip: 192.168.249.50  
mac: f4:54:33:91:cb:ee  
model-ref: 24VDC 16PT INPUT & 16PT OUTPUT, 1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER  
name: Rockwell 192.168.249.50, 24VDC 16PT INPUT & 16PT OUTPUT (Port1-Link01), 1769-L16ER/B LOGIX5316ER...  
... show more

## Technical Sheets


8 Components

Component	First activity	Last activity	IP	MAC	Tags	Vulnerabilities	Flows	VLAN ID	Sensor
1756-L55/A 1756-M12/A LOGIX5555 (Port1-Link00)	Oct 11, 2019 11:12:58 AM	May 24, 2021 12:32:15 PM	192.168.0.200	00:00:bc:5f:bc:ce	Controller	2	-10	-	
1756-OB16/A DCOUT ISOL (Port1-Link04)	Oct 11, 2019 11:12:58 AM	May 24, 2021 12:32:15 PM	192.168.0.200	00:00:bc:5f:bc:ce	No tags	0	-10	-	
1756-IB16/A DCIN ISOL (Port1-Link03)	Oct 11, 2019 11:12:58 AM	May 24, 2021 12:32:15 PM	192.168.0.200	00:00:bc:5f:bc:ce	No tags	0	-10	-	
1756-IB16/A DCIN ISOL (Port1-Link02)	Oct 11, 2019 11:12:58 AM	May 24, 2021 12:32:15 PM	192.168.0.200	00:00:bc:5f:bc:ce	No tags	0	-10	-	
1756-OB16/A DCOUT ISOL (Port1-Link05)	Oct 11, 2019 11:12:58 AM	May 24, 2021 12:32:15 PM	192.168.0.200	00:00:bc:5f:bc:ce	No tags	0	-10	-	
SUBSTATION-119-PLC01	Oct 11, 2019 11:12:58 AM	May 24, 2021 12:32:15 PM	192.168.0.200	00:00:bc:5f:bc:ce	No tags	9	-10	-	
1756-ENB/A (Port1-Link01)	Oct 11, 2019 11:12:58 AM	May 24, 2021 12:32:15 PM	192.168.0.200	00:00:bc:5f:bc:ce	No tags	9	-10	-	
Rockwell 192.168.0.200	Oct 11, 2019 11:12:58 AM	May 24, 2021 12:32:15 PM	192.168.0.200	00:00:bc:5f:bc:ce	No tags	0	-10	-	

Easily list the components of a device. Click on a component to view more details


# Group assets to define zones and conduits

- Organize your map to match the business and processes
  - Groups and Nested groups
  - Multi-faceted views
  - Quick drilldown
- Enables IT/OT collaboration to define security policies
- Group information shared with IT security tools such as Cisco ISE



# Leveraging visibility to drive segmentation

## Cisco Cyber Vision



Group OT assets into zones



Visualize conduits




Identify traffic violations



Share context with other platforms to enforce segmentation

# Leveraging visibility to drive segmentation

## Cisco Cyber Vision



- ✓ Group OT assets into zones
- ✓ Visualize conduits
- ✓ Identify traffic violations
- ✓ Share context with other platforms to enforce segmentation

	Cell 1	Cell 2	PLC	MES
Cell 1	✓	✗	✓	✗
Cell 2	✗	✓	✓	✗
PLC	✓	✓	✓	✓
MES	✗	✗	✓	✓


pxGrid

ISE profiles endpoints based on "Cell1" custom attribute and assigns SGT in AuthZ policy



Cisco ISE & Catalyst Center

RADIUS




# Leveraging visibility to drive segmentation



# Splunk for OT Security

Break silos between OT & IT domains with cross-domain detection and remediation




Improve threat detection, incident investigation, and response **across OT & IT domains** with telemetry from Cisco and 3rd party security products

# Cyber Vision 5.0

## Introducing the NEW Cyber Vision UX




Cyber Vision Center



Metadata

1 0 0 1  
0 0 1  
0 0 1  
1 0

Cyber Vision Sensors



Deep Packet Inspection and Active Discovery  
**built into your network infrastructure**

# Cyber Vision 5.0

## Enhanced Feature Set

- Custom preset category
- Zone and Conduit visualization
- Active discovery UI
- Inventory report
- DPI enhancements

## Enhanced Deployment Capabilities


- Catalyst IR1800 support
- Docker sensor
- Zero-touch provisioning (ZTP)
- Certificate auto renewal

## Integrations enhancement

- Splunk Add on App
- API improvements



### Cyber Vision Center



Metadata



### Cyber Vision Sensors



Deep Packet Inspection and Active Discovery  
**built into your network infrastructure**



# Secure Equipment Access + Updates



# Existing options are either security backdoors or come with many trade-offs



## Ad-Hoc Software

Often installed on operator workstations


Backdoor to IT security policies



## Cellular Gateways

Dedicated hardware installed by machine builders

Backdoor to IT security policies



## VPN

Always-On, All-or-Nothing access

Need additional controls to deny full network access




## ZTNA deployed in iDMZ

Provides controlled identity and context-aware access

Challenging to deploy in industrial settings

# But existing ZTNA solutions do not translate well to OT




Centralized ZTNA gateway located far from OT Assets  
Distributing ruggedized ZTNA gateways among cells in Level 0-2 is expensive, and cumbersome to maintain

Forces exposing private IPs outside Level-2  
Burden end users to unnecessarily NAT private IPs, negating resource isolation and increasing attack surface



Lack control on lateral movement  
Since gateway is far from the OT assets, a separate solution is needed for east-west segmentation among cells

# Simple, Scalable, Distributed ZTNA



- ✓ Get remote access to assets using the same switch that provides secure connectivity
- ✓ Eliminate complexity of creating and managing multiple firewall rules across all your sites
- ✓ Maintain resource isolation by traversing NAT boundaries without exposing private IP addresses
- ✓ Prevent lateral movement by enforcing segmentation on the switch that runs the ZTNA gateway


# Address the shadow IT problem



- ✓ Eliminate complexity of maintaining point hardware for remote access
- ✓ Stop security backdoors from cellular gateways
- ✓ Get remote access to assets using the same switch that provides secure connectivity
- ✓ Move beyond conventional remote access to ZTNA for OT assets

# Cisco Secure Equipment Access

Empower OT teams to easily perform remote operations while enforcing strong zero trust cybersecurity controls



## Remote user

- ✓ Clientless ZTNA: Browser-based remote access using RDP, VNC, HTTP(S), SSH, Telnet
- ✓ Agent-based ZTNA: remote access that supports native desktop applications



## Zero trust remote session control

- ✓ Configure least-privilege access
- ✓ Enforce multifactor authentication
- ✓ Check remote users' security posture
- ✓ Record, monitor, terminate sessions



Cloud simple

Accelerate time to value



Cisco secure

Built to keep operations safe



Designed for OT

Drive business outcomes



Highly scalable

Cloud + network working together

# Platforms that support SEA Agent

SEA Agent is the ZTNA gateway function embedded in network platforms

## Industrial Switches



SEA Agent

IE3300, IE3400

Roadmap



SEA Agent

IE3400H

Roadmap  
(Q4 CY23)



SEA Agent

IE3100



SEA Agent

IE9300

Roadmap  
(H2 CY24)

## Industrial Routers



SEA Agent

IR1101



SEA Agent

IR1800



SEA Agent

IR8300

Roadmap  
(H2 CY24)

CISCO *Engage*

GO BEYOND



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